Read the passage and choose the best answer to each question.
Each day, customs administrations in major trading nations process tens of thousands of declarations. Physically inspecting every consignment would bring trade to a standstill, yet inspecting too few risks allowing contraband, undervalued goods and prohibited items to slip through. Customs agencies have long relied on risk profiles, sets of rules derived from experience and intelligence, to decide which shipments merit closer examination. Increasingly, these rule-based systems are being supplemented by machine learning.
Machine-learning models are trained on historical declarations and the outcomes of past inspections. By identifying subtle combinations of variables associated with violations, such as an unusual pairing of commodity code and declared value, or a new importer using a route favoured by known offenders, the models can assign each incoming declaration a probability of non-compliance. Several administrations report that such tools have substantially raised the "hit rate", the proportion of inspections that uncover irregularities.
Image analysis offers further possibilities. Algorithms can examine X-ray scans of containers and highlight areas where the image does not match the declared contents, assisting officers who must otherwise interpret hundreds of scans per shift.
Nonetheless, the technology raises legitimate concerns. Models trained on past inspection data may reproduce the biases embedded in earlier decisions: if certain types of traders were historically inspected more often, more violations will have been recorded for them, and the model may continue to target them disproportionately. Furthermore, many advanced models function as "black boxes", making it difficult to explain to a trader why a shipment was selected. Smugglers, too, adapt their behaviour once they suspect which patterns are being monitored.
For these reasons, most experts advocate a hybrid approach in which algorithms prioritise cases but experienced officers retain the final decision. Continuous monitoring of model performance, periodic retraining and transparency about general selection criteria are regarded as essential safeguards.
Walk down almost any street in a Vietnamese city and you will encounter the informal economy: street vendors, motorbike taxi drivers, small family workshops and home-based tailors. These activities are generally legal in themselves, but they operate largely outside formal registration, labour contracts and social insurance. Estimates vary, yet a substantial share of Viet Nam's workforce is employed informally, a pattern common across developing economies.
The informal sector performs important functions. It absorbs workers who cannot find formal employment, particularly migrants from rural areas and people with limited education. It provides affordable goods and services to low-income households and offers flexibility that many workers value, such as the ability to set their own hours or combine work with caring responsibilities.
However, informality carries considerable costs. Informal workers typically lack protection against illness, injury and old age; a single health crisis can push a family into poverty. Their incomes are often irregular, and they have little access to credit or training. For the state, a large informal sector narrows the tax base and limits the coverage of social security schemes, placing a heavier burden on formal businesses and employees.
Policy responses have shifted over time. Earlier approaches tended to treat informality primarily as a problem of enforcement. More recent thinking emphasises lowering the barriers to formalisation: simplifying registration, offering presumptive or simplified tax regimes, and designing social insurance products that suit irregular incomes. Digital payment systems may also help, as they create transaction records that can make it easier for small businesses to demonstrate their creditworthiness.
Crucially, formalisation is likely to succeed only if its benefits are tangible. Workers and small entrepreneurs will register when doing so brings real advantages, such as access to loans, legal protection and benefits, rather than merely new obligations.
Traditional economic models assume that people decide whether to pay taxes by weighing the expected cost of evasion, the probability of being caught multiplied by the penalty, against the money saved. If this were the whole story, compliance would be far lower than it actually is in most countries, since audit rates are typically modest. Behavioural economics offers a more nuanced explanation: people's choices are also shaped by social norms, perceptions of fairness and the way information is presented to them.
This insight has led many tax administrations to experiment with "nudges", low-cost interventions that steer behaviour without restricting choice. A well-known example comes from the United Kingdom, where reminder letters stating that most people in the recipient's town had already paid their tax on time increased payment rates noticeably. The message worked by highlighting a social norm, implicitly suggesting that late payers were in the minority.
Other nudges simplify the process. Pre-filled tax returns, which require taxpayers merely to check and confirm information already held by the authority, reduce both effort and errors. Sending reminders by text message a few days before a deadline, or including a direct payment link, can also make compliance easier.
The tone of communication appears to matter as well. Studies in several countries have found that messages emphasising how tax revenue funds visible public services, such as schools and hospitals, can be more persuasive than those that merely threaten penalties, although results vary by context.
Nudges are not a substitute for effective enforcement and well-designed tax laws. Their effects are often modest and may fade over time. Nonetheless, because they are inexpensive to implement and easy to test through randomised trials, they represent an attractive complement to conventional tools. Viet Nam's tax sector, with its growing use of electronic communication with taxpayers, is well placed to experiment with such approaches.
On a hot summer afternoon, the centre of a large city can be several degrees warmer than the surrounding countryside. This phenomenon, known as the urban heat island effect, arises because cities replace vegetation and soil with materials such as asphalt, concrete and glass, which absorb and store heat during the day and release it slowly at night. Waste heat from air conditioners, vehicles and industry adds further warmth, while tall buildings can trap hot air and reduce ventilation.
The consequences extend beyond discomfort. Higher temperatures increase the risk of heat-related illnesses, particularly among the elderly, young children and outdoor workers such as construction labourers and street vendors. Demand for electricity rises as residents turn up their air conditioners, which in turn generates more waste heat, creating a vicious cycle. Elevated temperatures can also worsen air pollution by accelerating the formation of ground-level ozone.
For rapidly growing cities in Viet Nam, the issue is becoming more pressing. As climate change raises baseline temperatures, the additional heat generated by urban form may push conditions in some neighbourhoods towards levels that are hazardous to health.
Fortunately, a range of mitigation measures exist. Expanding tree cover and green spaces provides shade and cools the air through evaporation. Reflective or "cool" roofs and pavements absorb less solar energy. Preserving lakes and waterways helps moderate temperatures, and designing streets to allow airflow can reduce heat build-up. Some cities have introduced requirements for green space in new developments.
These measures are most effective when integrated into urban planning from the outset rather than added later. Moreover, attention should be paid to equity: low-income neighbourhoods often have the least green space and the poorest housing, leaving residents most exposed to extreme heat.
What dilemma do customs administrations face, according to paragraph 1?
What is the "hit rate"?
Why might a model target some traders disproportionately?
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What does the term "black boxes" suggest about some models?
They only work at night
They are painted black
Their decisions are difficult to explain
They are very cheap
What approach do most experts advocate?
Replacing officers entirely with algorithms
Inspecting every container
Stopping the use of machine learning
Algorithms prioritising cases while officers make final decisions
What characterises the informal economy according to paragraph 1?
It is found only in rural areas
It consists of illegal activities
It operates largely outside formal registration, contracts and social insurance
It is run by large companies
Which is NOT mentioned as a function of the informal sector?
Providing affordable goods to low-income households
Funding public infrastructure
Offering flexibility to workers
Absorbing workers without formal jobs
How does a large informal sector affect the state?
It narrows the tax base and limits social security coverage
It widens the tax base
It increases formal employment
It reduces poverty automatically
How has policy thinking changed, according to paragraph 4?
From cities to villages
From lowering barriers to stricter enforcement
From enforcement to lowering barriers to formalisation
From taxation to subsidies
The word "tangible" in the last paragraph is closest in meaning to ______.
temporary
real and noticeable
hidden
theoretical
Why does the writer think traditional models are incomplete?
Compliance is higher than they would predict
People never evade tax
Penalties are too high
Audit rates are very high
What is a "nudge" according to the passage?
A heavy penalty
An audit
A new tax law
A low-cost intervention that steers behaviour without restricting choice
Why did the UK reminder letters work?
They highlighted that most people had already paid on time
They offered discounts
They were sent by banks
They threatened prison
The word "implicitly" in paragraph 2 is closest in meaning to ______.
officially
loudly
without saying it directly
incorrectly
What is the writer's overall attitude towards nudges?
Strongly opposed
Cautiously positive, seeing them as a useful complement
Indifferent
Believes they can replace enforcement
What causes the urban heat island effect?
Fewer people in city centres
Cold winds from the countryside
More rain in cities
Materials that absorb and store heat, plus waste heat and reduced ventilation
What "vicious cycle" does the writer describe?
More trees cause more shade
More air conditioning produces more waste heat, which increases demand for cooling
More cars reduce temperatures
More rain causes more floods
Which group is NOT mentioned as particularly at risk from heat?
Office managers
The elderly
Outdoor workers
Young children
According to the passage, when are mitigation measures most effective?
When used only in summer
When paid for by residents
When added after buildings are completed
When integrated into urban planning from the outset
Why does the writer mention equity in the last paragraph?
All neighbourhoods are equally affected
Equity reduces temperatures
Low-income neighbourhoods are often most exposed to extreme heat
Rich areas have no trees