Read the passage and choose the best answer to each question.
Infrastructure is the backbone of economic development, yet building and maintaining highways, power plants, water systems and hospitals requires enormous sums of money. Faced with limited public budgets and high levels of debt, many governments have turned to public–private partnerships, commonly referred to as PPPs, to finance and deliver such projects.
Under a typical PPP arrangement, a private company or consortium finances, constructs and operates an infrastructure asset for a long period, often twenty to thirty years. In return, it recovers its investment either through user fees, such as tolls on a road, or through payments from the state. At the end of the contract, ownership is usually transferred to the government. Viet Nam has used PPP models, including build–operate–transfer contracts, for numerous highways and power projects.
Proponents argue that PPPs bring several advantages. Private investors may complete projects faster and more efficiently, because their profits depend on timely delivery and effective operation. The arrangement also allows risks, such as construction delays or cost overruns, to be transferred to the party best able to manage them. Above all, PPPs enable governments to build infrastructure without immediately increasing public borrowing.
Critics, however, point to significant pitfalls. If contracts are poorly designed, the public may end up paying more over the life of the project than it would have under conventional procurement. Optimistic traffic forecasts can lead to disputes when revenues fall short, and governments may be pressured to provide additional guarantees. In some cases, the location of toll stations or the level of fees has provoked public opposition, highlighting the importance of transparency and consultation.
The experience of many countries suggests that PPPs are neither a panacea nor inherently flawed. Their success depends on careful project selection, realistic forecasts, fair allocation of risks and strong institutional capacity to negotiate and monitor contracts in the public interest.
Competitive markets are widely regarded as beneficial for consumers. When firms compete, they have an incentive to lower prices, improve quality and innovate. Yet competition does not always sustain itself. Firms may collude to fix prices, or a dominant company may use its position to exclude rivals. Competition law exists to prevent such behaviour and to preserve the conditions under which markets can function effectively.
Viet Nam's competition legislation prohibits several categories of anti-competitive conduct. Agreements between competitors to fix prices, divide markets or rig bids are generally forbidden. Firms holding a dominant market position must not abuse it, for example by selling below cost to drive competitors out of the market, imposing unfair conditions on customers or refusing to deal without justification. In addition, mergers and acquisitions above certain thresholds must be notified to the competition authority, which may block those that would substantially lessen competition.
Enforcing these rules is challenging. Cartels are, by their nature, secret, and evidence of collusion is difficult to obtain. To address this, many jurisdictions, including Viet Nam, have introduced leniency programmes, which offer reduced penalties to cartel members who come forward and cooperate with investigators. Such programmes exploit the mutual distrust among conspirators, since each fears that another will confess first.
The rise of digital platforms has created new dilemmas. Platforms that act both as marketplaces and as sellers on those marketplaces may be tempted to favour their own products. Network effects, whereby a service becomes more valuable as more people use it, can allow one platform to dominate quickly. Traditional analysis, focused largely on price, may be ill-suited to markets where services are offered free of charge in exchange for users' data.
Competition authorities worldwide are therefore reconsidering their tools, seeking to protect consumers without discouraging the innovation that made these platforms successful in the first place.
How responsibilities and resources should be divided between central and local governments is a perennial question in public finance. Fiscal decentralisation refers to the transfer of spending responsibilities, revenue sources or both from the central level to subnational authorities, such as provinces and municipalities.
The theoretical case for decentralisation rests on the idea that local governments are closer to citizens and therefore better informed about local needs and preferences. A province may know more accurately than a national ministry where a new school or clinic is most needed. Decentralisation may also strengthen accountability, since residents can more easily observe and evaluate the performance of local officials. Furthermore, competition among localities to attract residents and investment could encourage efficiency and innovation.
In practice, however, decentralisation presents considerable challenges. Revenue-raising capacity varies enormously between regions: industrialised provinces with large tax bases can fund generous services, while poorer, mountainous provinces depend heavily on transfers from the centre. Without effective equalisation mechanisms, decentralisation can widen regional disparities. Moreover, local administrations may lack the technical capacity to plan and manage complex projects, and decentralised spending can create opportunities for waste if oversight is weak.
Viet Nam's budget system combines elements of both approaches. Provinces have considerable authority over spending and retain shares of certain revenues, while the central budget provides balancing transfers to provinces whose revenues are insufficient. A number of large cities have also been granted special mechanisms giving them greater autonomy in managing finances and investment.
The central question is not whether to decentralise but how. Experts emphasise that responsibilities should be matched with adequate resources, that equalisation transfers should be predictable and formula-based, and that greater autonomy should be accompanied by transparency and accountability, so that local discretion serves citizens rather than narrow interests.
The explosive growth of cross-border e-commerce has confronted customs administrations with a problem of sheer volume. Instead of a relatively small number of large shipments imported by registered businesses, authorities must now handle millions of small parcels sent directly to individual consumers from overseas platforms. Each parcel may be worth only a few dollars, but collectively they represent a substantial and rapidly expanding share of imports.
For many years, numerous countries, including Viet Nam, applied a de minimis threshold, a value below which imported goods were exempt from import duties and value added tax. The rationale was administrative efficiency: the cost of assessing and collecting tax on very low-value items was thought to exceed the revenue gained. With the surge in online purchases, however, the policy has come under scrutiny. Domestic retailers argue that the exemption gives foreign sellers an unfair advantage, since locally sold goods bear VAT in full. There are also concerns that some sellers deliberately undervalue or split shipments to stay below the threshold.
In response, several jurisdictions have narrowed or abolished such exemptions. Viet Nam, too, has moved to remove the VAT exemption for low-value goods sent by express delivery, aligning their treatment with that of domestically sold products.
Implementing these changes efficiently requires new approaches. Rather than collecting tax parcel by parcel at the border, some systems require large platforms to collect VAT at the point of sale and remit it to the authorities. Advance electronic data from couriers allows customs to assess risk before parcels arrive, focusing physical inspections on suspicious consignments, for instance those that may contain counterfeit products or items that do not meet safety standards.
The broader lesson is that customs procedures designed for an era of container trade must adapt to a world in which consumers increasingly act as importers themselves.
Why have many governments turned to PPPs?
How does a private partner typically recover its investment?
Which advantage of PPPs is described as the most important ("Above all")?
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The word "pitfalls" in paragraph 4 is closest in meaning to ______.
profits
hidden dangers or problems
rules
roads
What is the writer's overall conclusion about PPPs?
They always fail
Their success depends on good design, realistic forecasts and strong institutions
They should be replaced by foreign loans
They are a perfect solution
What is the purpose of competition law according to paragraph 1?
To protect firms from consumers
To help large firms grow
To prevent anti-competitive behaviour and preserve functioning markets
To set prices for all goods
Which is an example of abusing a dominant position?
Selling below cost to drive competitors out
Lowering prices due to efficiency
Advertising truthfully
Improving product quality
How do leniency programmes work?
They reward firms that grow fastest
They lower taxes for small firms
They allow cartels to operate legally
They offer reduced penalties to cartel members who confess and cooperate
What are "network effects"?
Firms cooperate on prices
Internet speeds increase
Platforms share data with governments
A service becomes more valuable as more people use it
Why may traditional analysis be ill-suited to digital markets?
Digital services are often free in exchange for data, so price is less informative
Prices online are always higher
Digital firms pay no tax
Digital markets have no consumers
What is fiscal decentralisation?
Increasing central taxes
Merging provinces
Transferring spending responsibilities and/or revenues from central to local governments
Reducing the number of civil servants
Which is NOT part of the theoretical case for decentralisation?
Accountability may be strengthened
It guarantees equal revenue for all regions
Local governments know local needs better
Competition among localities may encourage efficiency
Why might decentralisation widen regional disparities?
Revenue-raising capacity varies greatly between regions
The centre stops all transfers by law
Poor provinces collect more tax
All provinces have the same tax base
The word "perennial" in paragraph 1 is closest in meaning to ______.
new
unimportant
long-lasting, recurring
simple
According to experts, greater autonomy should be accompanied by ______.
more central control
higher taxes
fewer transfers
transparency and accountability
What new challenge has cross-border e-commerce created for customs?
Larger container ships
Handling millions of small parcels sent to individuals
Higher tax rates
Fewer imports
What was the original rationale for the de minimis threshold?
The cost of collecting tax on very low-value items exceeded the revenue
To protect domestic retailers
To increase imports
To support foreign sellers
Why do domestic retailers object to the exemption?
It reduces delivery times
It applies only to them
It gives foreign sellers an unfair advantage
It increases their sales
What does "split shipments" in paragraph 2 refer to?
Sending goods by two airlines
Returning damaged goods
Sharing parcels with neighbours
Dividing an order into several parcels to stay below the threshold
What is the "broader lesson" in the final paragraph?
Tax should be abolished
Customs procedures must adapt to consumers acting as importers
E-commerce should be banned
Container trade will disappear